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CIVIL CONSPIRACY—HOLDING
COLLEGE OFFICIALS ACCOUNTABLE
Landon Mignardi*
ABSTRACT
College sports have always been somewhat marred by controversy—whether it be point
shaving, paying off players, or academic fraud—as the money to be made from college sports
and the overwhelming desire to win has always seemed to generate impropriety among
schools, players, and coaches. However, in recent years, scandals within college athletics
programs have escalated beyond mere efforts to “win at all costs,” with the spotlight now on
instances of sexual violence committed by players against other students and the cover-ups
of these assaults. Following the massive cover-up and mishandling of sexual assaults by
Baylor University’s athletic department and officials, and the arrest and conviction of a
sexually abusive physician at Michigan State University (MSU), it has become apparent
that these instances of intra-university collusion are not “isolated incidents.” Instead, these
events are evidence of a pattern of behavior employed by institutions of higher education—
institutions that prioritize their image over the safety of their students. Further, these coverups undoubtedly involve more actors than are held accountable, with scandals leading to
the removal of university “faces,” while lower-level employees, staff, and coaches are retained
despite their obvious involvement.
This Comment will address the goings-on within college athletic programs and will argue
that such catastrophic failures on the part of schools like Baylor and MSU are likely
evidence of a conspiracy within those institutions to defraud their students or interfere with
their civil rights, thereby jeopardizing the safety of every student enrolled. It will be a factintensive analysis of the tragic events at Baylor and MSU and of the lawsuits filed against
both schools by victims. This analysis will show that a much greater evil is at play at these,
and likely many other institutions. Not only did these universities fail to adhere to policy,
protect their students, or act with any common sense or decency—they actively attempted to
inhibit investigations and intentionally tried to cover up sexual harassment, sexual assault,
and even gang rapes in order to protect their athletic programs, their employees’ jobs, and
their schools’ reputations.
*
J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2020; B.S., University of Oklahoma,
May 2017. Thank you to Professor Joanna Grossman for her guidance as I wrote this Comment, and
thanks to my family and friends for their constant love and support throughout law school.
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Next, this Comment will discuss the shortcomings of Title IX, focusing on how the statute
does little to provide an adequate remedy for the victims at Baylor and MSU. Additionally,
the impotency of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sanctions will be
analyzed, illustrating how those sanctions do little to encourage athletic officials to adhere
to proper Title IX or university policy. Finally, this Comment argues that the pursuit of
civil conspiracy claims against athletic programs and universities would: (1) deter schools
from protecting alleged rapists in order to promote their athletic programs, and (2) root out
and punish individuals responsible for willfully protecting students unequally or
discouraging reporting of sexual assaults. Additionally, this Comment advocates for neutral
government or academic agencies to handle these cases, thereby removing these kinds of
investigations entirely from the hands of ill-equipped athletic programs and coaches.
I.

II.

III.

IV.
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I. THE DARKER SIDE OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS AND THE NATURE
OF CIVIL CONSPIRACIES
“She told Michigan State University she was sexually assaulted by Dr. Larry Nassar.
. . . MSU told her she wasn’t.”1

1. Matt Mencarini, At MSU: Assault, Harassment and Secrecy, LANSING ST. J. (Jan. 25, 2018,
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College sports have always been somewhat marred by controversy—whether it
be point shaving, paying off players, or academic fraud.2 As in all things, where
there is money to be made, scandal is soon to follow. In recent years, these
scandals have taken a much darker turn, extending beyond mere efforts to “win
at all costs” into exploitation, cover-ups, and grievous misconduct by players and,
more significantly, coaches and staff.
In late 2001, two women, Lisa Simpson and Anne Gilmore, were allegedly
raped by football players and incoming high school recruits at the University of
Colorado at Boulder.3 Simpson and Gilmore had been Colorado football
program “Ambassadors,” which involved showing recruits around campus; in
some cases, Ambassadors were encouraged by university officials to have sex with
incoming high school recruits as a lure for prospective athletes.4 This “unofficial”
but nevertheless school-sanctioned policy resulted in multiple reports of sexual
violence against young women by football players and recruits at off-campus
parties.5 Even more troubling, head football coach Gary Barnett tried to cover it
up; he intimidated victims6 and “pressured the campus police to drop a sexual
assault investigation of football players.”7
Following the events at Colorado, the spotlight on sexual violence and college
athletics intensified. This national focus would only increase after two major
scandals broke in the late 2010s: one involving a massive cover-up and
mishandling of sexual assaults by Baylor University’s athletic department and
officials,8 and the other involving a sexually abusive pedophile employed by
Michigan State University (MSU).9
The troubling events at Baylor began following rape allegations against football
players by multiple female students.10 As more accusations piled up, evidence was
uncovered that Baylor had knowledge of the criminal and personal histories
(including incidences of domestic violence) of the two players accused but
proceeded to admit them to the university and the football team.11 Two football
12:31 PM), https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2016/12/15/michigan-statesexual-assault-harassment-larry-nassar/94993582/ [https://perma.cc/49UB-K2ZZ].
2. Alan Rubenstein, The 25 Biggest Scandals in NCAA History, BLEACHER REP. (Sept. 20, 2010),
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/468221-the-25-biggest-scandals-in-ncaa-history#slide17
[https://perma.cc/2YKF-UVGF].
3. Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007).
4. Id. at 1173, 1177.
5. Id. at 1173–75, 1181.
6. Ann Scales, Student Gladiators and Sexual Assault: A New Analysis of Liability for Injuries Inflicted
by College Athletes, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 205, 214 (2009). After discovering that a nineteen-yearold female trainer for the football team had reported being raped by a football player to the police,
Barnett called the alleged victim into his office and “told her that if she pursued the charges he would
‘back his player 100%’ and that her ‘life would change.’” Id.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Jessica Luther & Dan Solomon, Silence at Baylor, TEX. MONTHLY (Aug. 20, 2015),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/article/silence-at-baylor/ [https://perma.cc/QA7S-8UV5].
9. See, e.g., Paula Lavigne & Nicole Noren, Applications to Michigan State Drop After Nassar,
Sexual
Assault
Scandals,
ESPN
(Dec.
2,
2018),
https://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/25430618/applications-michigan-state-universitydrop-larry-nassar-sexual-assault-scandals-espn-lines [https://perma.cc/Y7JK-HST8].
10. See Luther & Solomon, supra note 8.
11. Id.
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players were eventually arrested and convicted of sexual assault, despite being
cleared by university disciplinary officials following an internal investigation.12
These incidents resulted in an outside investigation of Baylor and its handling of
on- and off-campus sexual assault.13 The results were appalling. Baylor’s Title IX
office, which handles allegations of sexual misconduct and gender discrimination,
and its athletic department, including head coach Art Briles and athletic director
Ian McCaw, had either failed to respond to or report sexual assaults on campus,
and, in some cases, actively resisted investigating allegations altogether.14 One
lawsuit against the university alleged “at least fifty-two acts of rape by thirty-one
Baylor football players from 2011-2014.”15 This stream of accusations against a
university regarding its handling of sexual misconduct was unprecedented—that
is, until stories broke in 2016 about MSU and Larry Nassar.
MSU was implicated in equally abhorrent administrative misconduct when two
former gymnasts accused Larry Nassar, a physician and assistant professor at
MSU, of sexually assaulting them during treatment.16 A subsequent investigation
revealed similar mishandlings by MSU of reports of abuse, and ultimately resulted
in allegations of abuse against Nassar by at least 150 young women.17 Nassar was
sentenced to 175 years in prison after pleading guilty to charges of sexual abuse.18
These massive failures by institutions of higher education are not only disturbing,
but ask a bigger question: why are these systematic failures rampant in our college
athletic programs?
The American love affair with college athletics runs deep. Since its inception,
the popularity of collegiate sports has been on the rise, with schools generating
untold amounts of revenue from the draw of their all-star programs, incredible
stadiums and facilities, and massive fanbases. Today, colleges and universities
across the United States are making more from their athletic programs than ever
before, particularly from their football programs, with the average Division I
program generating $31.9 million in revenue per year.19
And then there are coaches’ salaries. In 2018, University of Alabama head

12. See id.
13. Andrew Solomon, Preventing Recurrences of the Cover-Ups at Penn State & Baylor (and Now
Michigan State): Where Does It End?, 28 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 379, 381 (2018).
14. See id. at 390–400 (detailing the events at Baylor).
15. Id. at 415. Prior to Briles’ tenure as head coach, Baylor’s football program had an abysmal
losing record. Baylor Bears School History, SPORTS REFERENCE (Feb. 18, 2021, 6:34 AM),
https://www.sports-reference.com/cfb/schools/baylor/index.html [https://perma.cc/P2VX-AC9B].
However, shortly after Briles’ hiring (between 2010–2015), the program went 7–6, 10–3, 8–5, 11–2,
11–2, and 10–3, respectively. Id.
16. Tim Evans, Mark Alesia & Marisa Kwiatkowski, Former USA Gymnastics Doctor Accused of
Abuse,
INDY
STAR
(Jan.
24,
2018,
4:35
PM),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2016/09/12/former-usa-gymnastics-doctor-accusedabuse/89995734/ [http//perma.cc/64D7-ERYR].
17. See id.
18. Id.
19. Cork Gaines & Mike Nudelman, The Average College Football Team Makes More Money Than
the Next 35 College Sports Combined, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 5, 2017, 2:36 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/college-sports-football-revenue-2017-10 [https://perma.cc/S4TMAY36].

COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

96

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 74:92

coach Nick Saban signed an eight-year deal for approximately $74 million.20 Given
the immense amount of pressure and stress coaches are subjected to and the
countless hours they spend planning, traveling, and recruiting, many believe this
high salary is justified.21 In turn, coaches, universities, and athletic programs now
have more to lose than ever before;22 this, plus pressures from schools’ boards of
regents23 and other sources, likely contributes to the conspiratorial nature of
athletic departments and their efforts to cover up reports of sexual assaults and
dissuade victims from seeking justice.
This Comment will address the goings-on within college athletic programs and
will present arguments that the catastrophic failures of schools like Baylor and
MSU are likely evidence of a conspiracy within those institutions to defraud their
students or interfere with their civil rights, thereby jeopardizing the safety of all
who are enrolled. It will be a fact-intensive analysis of the events at Baylor and
MSU, and of the recent lawsuits filed against both these schools by victims, which
will tend to show that a much greater evil is at play at these, and likely many other
institutions. Not only did these universities fail to adhere to policy, protect their
students, or act with any common sense or decency—these universities actively
attempted to inhibit investigations and intentionally sought to cover up sexual
harassment, sexual assault, and even gang rapes24 in order to protect their own
athletic programs, their jobs, and their schools’ reputations.
Next, this Comment will discuss the shortcomings of Title IX and focus on
how the statute does little to provide an adequate remedy for victims like those at
Baylor and MSU. It will further analyze the impotency of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) sanctions and how such sanctions do little to
encourage athletic officials to adhere to proper Title IX or university policy. These
cover-ups undoubtedly involve more actors than are held accountable—with
scandals leading to the removal of university “faces” while retaining lower-level
employees, staff, and coaches, who eventually end up replacing the people fired
in the first place.25
Finally, this Comment argues that the pursuit of civil conspiracy claims against

20. Associated Press, Alabama Gives Nick Saban New Deal with One-Year Extension Through 2025,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 27, 2018), https://www.si.com/college-football/2018/07/27/nicksaban-contract-alabama-extension-term-value [https://perma.cc/5N4G-XUQJ].
21. See, e.g., Leigh Steinberg, Massive Coaching Salaries Are Justified, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2012, 12:15
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/leighsteinberg/2012/12/08/massive-coaching-salaries-arejustified/?sh=25c52cf13099 [https://perma.cc/8JSA-VFK6].
22. See Will Hobson & Steven Rich, Playing in the Red, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/sports/wp/2015/11/23/running-up-thebills/?utm_term=.cd1e4c90be5e [https://perma.cc/R43E-D9CN].
23. Defendants Cary Gray, Ron Murff, and David Harper’s Original Answer at 28, Shillinglaw
v. Baylor Univ., No. DC-17-01225 (116th Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex. Feb. 2, 2017) [hereinafter
Baylor Regents’ Answer] (quoting a Baylor donor: “If you mention Baylor’s [institutional] mission
one more time, I’m going to throw up. . . . I was promised a national championship.”).
24. See Second Amended Complaint & Jury Demand ¶¶ 69, 73, Doe v. Baylor Univ., No. 6:17CV-27 (W.D. Tex. May 26, 2017), 2017 WL 4680374 [hereinafter Elizabeth Doe Complaint].
25. See Associated Press, Baylor Football Keeping Assistant Coaches in Wake of Scandal, USA TODAY
(June
9,
2016,
12:44
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/big12/2016/06/09/baylor-football-keepingassistant-coaches-wake-scandal/85648436/ [https://perma.cc/6VGJ-F23B].
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athletic programs and universities would: (1) deter schools from protecting alleged
rapists in order to promote their athletic programs, and (2) root out and punish
individuals responsible for willfully protecting students unequally or discouraging
reporting of sexual assaults. Additionally, this Comment advocates for neutral
government or academic agencies to handle these cases, thereby insulating these
kinds of investigations from interference by athletic programs, coaches, and
university officials.
These conspiracies are abhorrent—even more so when they occur in the context
of universities that fail to protect their own students. These conspiracies are not
isolated incidents; they are evidence of a pattern of behavior employed by
institutions of higher education.26 Ultimately, pursuing conspiracy claims against
these actors will protect future victims, raise awareness of the intricacies of intrauniversity collusion, and deter school officials from repeating the mistakes made
at MSU and Baylor.
A. A FLOOR, NOT A CEILING: THE STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES OF UNIVERSITIES
AND THE INADEQUACIES OF TITLE IX
Title IX has not always been the blunt instrument of litigation that it is today.
Part of the Education Act of 1972, Title IX was “derived . . . from the language of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” and like its predecessor, prohibited
discrimination in activities which receive federal funding.27 In addition to barring
the use of federal resources for “discriminatory purposes,” Title IX also ensures
equality of treatment for students28 and even sets out requirements schools must
satisfy when responding to reports of sexual harassment and sexual violence.29
The penalties for violating Title IX could be as extreme as “the termination of
all or part of an institution’s federal funding” or in other circumstances, the loss
of “grants, subsidies, and other program funds from the federal government.”30
Nevertheless, to date, “no institution has actually lost any federal money.”31
Further, Title IX provides a private right of action for students against a noncomplying university.32 However, a major issue with Title IX suits is their inability
to hold individuals accountable. Oftentimes, universities merely fire the “faces”
of their programs, like head coaches and athletic directors, while retaining other

26. See generally Solomon, supra note 13, at 400–01 (discussing the lack of response or
improvements made by football programs following the tragedies at Penn State despite nationwide
negative publicity, NCAA sanctions, and even criminal convictions of the university’s former
president, vice president, and athletic director).
27. Hillary Hunter, Strike Three: Calling Out College Officials for Sexual Assault on Campus, 50 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 277, 283 (2018).
28. Id. at 283–84.
29. Summary of Major Provisions of the Department of Education’s Title IX Final Rule, DEP’T OF
EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/titleix-summary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SDU9-D792].
30. Title IX, TYLER JUNIOR COLL., http://www.tjc.edu/TitleIX [https://perma.cc/MV68Q7CF].
31. Title IX Questions & Answers, FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUND., https://feminist.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/TitleIXQA2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/M4HN-GCQ7].
32. Hunter, supra note 27, at 285–86.
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employees who likely actively interfered with investigations.33
Under current precedent, “courts cannot hold coaches, teachers,
administrators, and other officials personally accountable” under Title IX without
the finding of a special relationship.34 Additionally, Title IX lawsuits highlight
shortcomings within our legal system. When Title IX cases are settled out of court,
the public is not informed on the exact details of a coach’s misconduct which may
lead to their hiring at other institutions.35 The lack of individual accountability in
a Title IX action leaves lower-level assistant coaches and athletic trainers
unaccountable for their actions which promulgate sexual discrimination and
create a hostile environment for students.
Another major problem with Title IX requirements is that they are vague
standards that universities must meet in order to “protect” their students.36 In
reality, once a scandal breaks, universities settle out of court (using insurance), fire
their high-level administrators such as head coaches, presidents, and athletic
directors (with severance), and “agree” to amend their institutional policies
without any admission of guilt or wrongdoing on the part of the university.37
Likewise, the NCAA has been extraordinarily ineffective in administering
institutional discipline despite its potential for oversight. Initially founded in
1906 to “protect young people from the dangerous and exploitive athletics
practices of the time,” the NCAA’s role has evolved into a rulemaking and
administrative body for all of college sports.38 For example, the NCAA establishes
“levels of membership [in different athletic conferences and divisions], numbers
of scholarships, [and] recruitment policies . . . to an enormously detailed degree.”39
However, until 2017, the NCAA had “no rules prohibiting either sexual
harassment or sexual assault by college athletes, nor any remedies against athletes
. . . [or] institutions” whose athletic programs presented heightened risks of sexual
misconduct.40 Hopefully these new guidelines will be enforced and will encourage
33. See Associated Press, supra note 25.
34. Hunter, supra note 27, at 288, 291.
35. Tim Doherty, Art Briles ‘Not a Candidate’ for Position in USM Football Program, WLOX (Feb.
6, 2019, 11:29 PM), https://www.wlox.com/2019/02/06/art-briles-not-candidate-position-usmfootball-program/ [https://perma.cc/AF4R-9QDV] (“I have interviewed Art Briles for an assistant
position at Southern Miss and believe he is a man who deserves a second chance. . . . He committed
no crime.”).
36. See Solomon, supra note 13, at 417 (“The case was settled only after the plaintiffs were
satisfied that the university made significant progress in sexual assault prevention education and the
way in which the school responded to assault claims, which included the hiring of six more people
in Title IX compliance positions.”).
37. See id.
38. Dan Treadway, Why Does the NCAA Exist?, HUFFPOST (Aug. 6, 2013, 1:39 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/johnny-manziel-ncaa-eligibility_b_3020985
[https://perma.cc/6PDV-XVED].
39. Scales, supra note 6, at 224.
40. Id. But see NCAA Board of Governors Policy on Campus Sexual Violence, NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.ncaa.org/sport-science-institute/topics/ncaa-boardgovernors-policy-campus-sexual-violence [https://perma.cc/GN83-KG7E].
Each university chancellor/president, director of athletics and campus Title IX
coordinator must attest annually that:
1.

The athletics department is informed on, integrated in, and compliant with
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universities to become proactive in overseeing their Title IX operations as well as
the disciplinary conduct, or lack thereof, in their athletic departments.
Unfortunately, history shows that investigating and amending a school’s policies
is an arduous task, with some investigations taking years to complete.41 Therefore,
a more effective action is to bring private lawsuits against athletic departments
that engage in conspiratorial practices.
B. THE ANATOMY OF CIVIL CONSPIRACIES
Generally, actions of civil conspiracy arise through state common law or
statutes, as well as federal statutes.42 More specifically, federal law provides a cause
of action against those who conspire to deprive anyone of the equal protection of
the laws.43 A civil conspiracy has five elements: (1) “an association of two or more
persons”; (2) “an unlawful objective”; (3) “an agreement or understanding with
regard to the objective and the manner in which it was to be achieved”; (4)
“commission of an unlawful, overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy”; and (5)
“injury as a result of the overt act.”44 Actions of civil conspiracy against university
athletic programs could pose a great advantage to plaintiffs based on the damages
available. Defendants in a civil conspiracy are held jointly and severally liable for
the damages suffered by the plaintiff; moreover, a plaintiff can recover
compensatory damages and attorney’s fees, as well as punitive damages in
“egregious cases.”45
Damages aside, the most important aspect of civil conspiracy claims for
institutional policies and processes regarding sexual violence prevention
and proper adjudication and resolution of acts of sexual and interpersonal
violence.
2.

The institutional policies and processes regarding sexual violence
prevention and adjudication, and the name and contact information for
the campus Title IX coordinator, are readily available within the
department of athletics, and are provided to student-athletes.

3.

All student-athletes, coaches and staff have been educated each year on
sexual violence prevention, intervention and response, to the extent
allowable by state law and collective bargaining agreements.

....
Further, the athletics department will cooperate with college or university investigations
into reports and matters related to sexual and interpersonal violence involving
student-athletes and athletics department staff in a manner compliant with
institutional policies for all students.
If a school is not able to attest their compliance with the above requirements, it will
be prohibited from hosting any NCAA championship competitions for the next
applicable academic year.
Id. (emphasis added).
41. See generally Sara Lipka, How 46 Title IX Cases Were Resolved, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.
(Jan.
15,
2016),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-46-Title-IX-Cases-Were/234912
[https://perma.cc/72QK-HXB8].
42. James L. Buchwalter, Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy, in 54 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 603
§ 1 (2012).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681.
44. Buchwalter, supra note 42.
45. Id. §§ 38–42.
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plaintiffs lies in the joint and several liability imposed on members of the
conspiracy. This stipulation provides that all involved in covering up sexual
assaults at the behest of a superior would be held liable for such injustice, as
opposed to only the “faces” of the institution.46 Liability of co-conspirators
extends to those who “encouraged, facilitated, or planned the tort in furtherance
of the conspiracy.”47 In other words, all those implicated in the conspiracy may be
charged with an actionable deed charged to one member.48 The issue with current
actions in these cases is the lack of personal accountability for the individuals
involved and the subsequent settlements by parent institutions49 who take the
brunt of the backlash in the courtroom and in the media.
This distinction could provide a powerful argument for potential plaintiffs who
will be able to implicate officials who may not have carried out the unlawful act
but saw to its completion. Interestingly, the plaintiff does not have to prove that
all members of the conspiracy were in contact with one another, and it is possible
that a conspiracy existed despite conspirators not knowing all of the other
members.50 Additionally, there are policy reasons which might encourage courts
to allow the assertion of civil conspiracy claims against university officials due to
issues with disclosure. Under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), the
Family Educational Rights Privacy Act, Title IX requirements, and institutional
policy, universities are subject to confidentiality clauses which make it difficult for
plaintiffs to get all of the facts and know who was involved without a chance for
formal discovery.51
As previously discussed, institutions often retain their lower-level employees
who likely carried out the cover-up and pressured victims to not come forward.
Universities then either fire their seated high-level officials, like head coaches or
athletic directors, or encourage them to resign (with full severance of course), all
the while maintaining secrecy and keeping the public in the dark about the extent
of the damage done.52
Thus, properly applied, claims of civil conspiracy against university officials
46. See generally Phillip Ericksen, Federal Judge Allows New Lawsuit Against Baylor, Briles, McCaw,
Waco
PD,
WACO-TRIBUNE
HERALD
(July
25,
2018),
https://www.wacotrib.com/news/city_of_waco/federal-judge-allows-new-lawsuit-against-baylorbriles-mccaw-waco/article_442f904e-8b28-5923-b103-337c01762e78.html [https://perma.cc/T98XGVFV].
47. Reuter v. MasterCard Int’l, Inc., 921 N.E.2d 1205, 1217 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
48. Mireles v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
49. See Mitch Smith & Anemona Hartocollis, Michigan State’s $500 Million for Nassar Victims
Dwarfs
Other
Settlements,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/us/larry-nassar-michigan-state-settlement.html
[https://perma.cc/ZVT4-UCTA] (referencing massive settlements by MSU and Penn State after the
Nassar and Sandusky scandals, respectively); see also Solomon, supra note 13, at 382 (citing a $2.48
million settlement by the University of Tennessee following a Title IX lawsuit by eight female
students).
50. Buchwalter, supra note 42, § 10.
51. See Baylor Regents’ Answer, supra note 23, at 6.
52. See id. at 25. Despite being the “the most comprehensive document that a University has
ever issued,” the “Findings of Fact” was still a vague summary of the complete investigative report
made by the law firm Pepper Hamilton, hired by Baylor. Id.; see Baylor Univ. Bd. of Regents, Findings
of Fact, BAYLOR UNIV. 1 (2016) [hereinafter Findings of Fact], available at
https://www.baylor.edu/thefacts/doc.php/266596.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE7A-5BM7].
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who cover up criminal conduct will hold them responsible for their own actions
as well as the actions of their co-conspirators, deterring university faculties across
the country from attempting to pull off a “Baylor” or “MSU” type cover-up.
However, before analyzing how plaintiffs like those in the Baylor and MSU cases
might bring such suits, one must review the pertinent facts in those two cases. For
the purposes of this Comment, civil conspiracies will be discussed in their general
terms, followed by potential applications of state civil conspiracy law and a focus
on 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) conspiracy claims in the federal context.
II. A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF THE FAILURES OF BAYLOR AND
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
A. “A BUNCH OF BAD DUDES”: BAYLOR UNIVERSITY
“I think as long as they’re catching footballs and scoring touchdowns, the school won’t
do anything.”53
As one sports law expert put it:
[T]he Baylor saga makes it abundantly clear that Penn State’s situation54 did
not cause fundamental legal or institutional changes to occur within big-time
college athletics and shows that a dark and troubling culture continues to
exist even within highly prestigious universities: a culture built on intense
loyalty to protect the interests of the athletic program, almost at any cost. At
both Penn State and Baylor, prestigious universities—led by both prominent
university presidents and high-profile head football coaches—systematically
protected its football program at the expense of victims of sexual violence.55
Starting as early as 2011, Baylor, and even the Waco Police Department, made
clear that they would be playing by different rules when it came to investigating
any crimes allegedly committed by football players.56 One physical altercation
between athletes and nonathletes at an off-campus event led to three football
players being charged with assault; although, the police allegedly “took
extraordinary steps to keep [the incident] from public view.”57 According to a
police report, the Waco police pulled the case file from the computer system and
kept it in a locked office.58 In another incident, “a football operations staff official
53. Paula Lavigne & Mark Schlabach, Police Records Detail Several More Violence Allegations Against
Baylor
Football
Players,
ESPN
(May
19,
2016),
http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/15562625/waco-police-records-reveal-additionalviolence-allegations-baylor-football-players [https://perma.cc/K9XB-DD2P] (quoting an alleged
victim).
54. Solomon, supra note 13, at 401 (referring to the 2011 scandal at Penn State involving Jerry
Sandusky, a former Penn State football coach, who had been using university facilities to sexually
abuse young boys while Penn State officials knew of the abuse and failed to report it).
55. Id.
56. See id. at 413–14; Lavigne & Schlabach, supra note 53.
57. Lavigne & Schlabach, supra note 53.
58. Tom Fornelli, Waco Police Reportedly Shielded Baylor Allegations from Public: 3 Things to Know,
CBS SPORTS (May 18, 2016, 3:06 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/wacopolice-reportedly-shielded-baylor-allegations-from-public-3-things-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/6LNH-
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tried to talk [a] victim out of pressing criminal charges. Meanwhile, Coach Briles
texted Athletics Director Ian McCaw: ‘Just talked to [the player] - he said Waco
PD was there - said they were going to keep it quiet.’” 59 McCaw responded: “That
would be great if they kept it quiet!”60
These communications set the tone for the factual allegations: that Baylor
considered football more vital than the safety of its students, and, moreover, that
“win at all costs” meant that school officials and directors would do anything they
could to ensure their football team’s success.61 Emails and text messages filed as
part of a libel suit by former Director of Football Operations Collin Shillinglaw
against Baylor further “reveal[ed] that Briles, Shillinglaw, other assistant coaches
and even former athletic director Ian McCaw were all tied to a pattern of covering
up wrongdoing by arranging cooperation from authorities and legal
representation.”62
1. Elizabeth Doe v. Baylor University
This complaint, like many others, begins with allegations regarding the “Baylor
Bruins,” a “female hostess program” through which young, attractive female
students would accompany recruits through campus and ensure they enjoyed their
time at their university visit.63 Such a program is reminiscent of the female
ambassador program at the University of Colorado.64 An investigation concluded
that “at least 52 acts of rape, including five gang rapes, by not less than 31 different
football players” had occurred under Art Briles’ tenure as head coach between
2011 and 2014.65 Notably, Baylor failed to take appropriate action with regard to
these complaints.66
The complaint cites an internal investigation by the Baylor Regents (the
Findings of Fact) which “uncovered an endemic culture in the football program
of attempting to conceal and avoid reporting disciplinary problems involving
players.”67 Additionally, the Findings of Fact conceded that “athletics and football
personnel” not only “affirmatively chose not to report sexual violence” but “actively
divert[ed] cases from the student conduct or criminal processes.”68 It is this action,
rather than Baylor’s inaction, that is the most troubling. The school did not
simply fail to follow procedures or obey Title IX; its athletic department took the
UUFP] (“The investigating officer asked the commander that ‘the case be pulled from the computer
system so that only persons who had a reason to inquire about the report would be able to access
it.’”).
59. Chip Patterson, Docs: Art Briles, Baylor Officials Actively Involved in Covering Up Player Incidents,
CBS SPORTS (Feb. 3, 2017, 3:14 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/docs-revealart-briles-baylor-coaches-actively-involved-in-covering-up-player-incidents/ [https://perma.cc/QU5XHRTN].
60. Id.
61. See Elizabeth Doe Complaint, supra note 24, ¶¶ 12–13, 59–60, 62.
62. Patterson, supra note 59.
63. Elizabeth Doe Complaint, supra note 24, ¶¶ 25–27.
64. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1180 (10th Cir. 2007).
65. Elizabeth Doe Complaint, supra note 24, ¶¶ 40–41.
66. Findings of Fact, supra note 52, at 10.
67. Elizabeth Doe Complaint, supra note 24, ¶ 71.
68. Findings of Fact, supra note 52, at 10–11 (emphasis added).
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law into its own hands. This is further illustrated in the following summary of
Elizabeth Doe’s complaint.
On April 18, 2013, Ms. Doe was allegedly raped by two Baylor football players,
Tre’Von Armstead and Shamycheal Chatman.69 Following a call from Doe’s
roommate’s boyfriend, police soon arrived at the scene.70 Despite a prior rape
allegation against Chatman by a student athletic trainer,71 Waco police failed to
interview either Chatman or Armstead.72 Ultimately, few meaningful
consequences resulted from the incident. Baylor helped Chatman transfer to Sam
Houston State University73 and eventually expelled Armstead, two years after
Elizabeth Doe’s first complaint to police, citing a generic “violation of team
rules.”74
2. Setting the Record Straight—Shillinglaw v. Baylor University
In their answer to a defamation lawsuit filed by Colin Shillinglaw, the former
Assistant Athletics Director for Football Operations at Baylor, the Board of
Regents sought to “set the record straight” and provide greater insight into Briles
and the athletic department’s conduct.75 According to the Board, Shillinglaw
“served as a pivotal figure in an internal disciplinary system” which led to sexual
assaults and other misconduct being mishandled or not reported.76 In his capacity
as disciplinarian, Shillinglaw allegedly conspired with Briles to structure their
informational system to “insulate[] Briles from knowing about misconduct.”77
When Briles was actually alerted to player disciplinary issues, he “encouraged
Shillinglaw and . . . his staff to keep the problems internal to the program and not
alert other campus authorities,” resulting in a system where football players were
held to different standards than other students.78 Even accusations of gang rape
against his football players did not persuade Briles to investigate his players’
culpability or even punish or suspend his players.79
Unsurprisingly, Shillinglaw was also uncooperative and untruthful with the
Pepper Hamilton investigators who were hired for an independent investigation
of Baylor affairs at the behest of the Board.80 The investigators’ Findings of Fact
detailed evidence that Briles had relied on Shillinglaw to find legal representation
for players accused of any criminal misconduct.81 Moreover, Shillinglaw told
Pepper Hamilton that he had no recollection of meeting with an alleged domestic
violence victim of Baylor defensive end, Shawn Oakman, yet Shillinglaw had the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Elizabeth Doe Complaint, supra note 24, ¶¶ 83, 89, 97.
Id. ¶¶ 92–94.
Id. ¶ 77.
Id. ¶ 100.
See id. ¶¶ 105–06.
Id. ¶¶ 121–22.
Baylor Regents’ Answer, supra note 23, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
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victim’s contact information in his cell phone and emails showed that he had even
received a police report detailing Oakman’s past incidences of domestic abuse.82
These allegations by the Baylor Board highlight the complexity and effectiveness
of the “insulation” between head coach Art Briles and the staff underneath him—
insulation which makes it far more difficult for potential plaintiffs to make factual
allegations against suspected perpetrators.
3. Jane Doe v. Baylor University
An additional complaint against Baylor and Briles provided further insight into
the structure of insulation within the football program, revealing text messages
between Briles and an assistant coach about how to handle “disciplining” a
player.83 Assistant coaches did the dirty work while Briles advised from afar:
In fact, it would not be the first time a Baylor football player had brandished
a gun at a female student-athlete. Earlier that semester, in February 2013, an
assistant coach notified Briles that a football player had brandished a gun at
a female student-athlete. Pepper Hamilton reportedly uncovered the
following text messages between the assistant coach and Briles:
•

Briles: “what a fool - she reporting to authorities.”

•

Assistant coach: “She’s acting traumatized . . . Trying to talk her
clam [sic] now . . . Doesn’t seem to want to report though.”

•

Briles: “U gonna talk to [the player].”

•

Assistant coach: “Yes sir, just did. Caught him on the way to class .
. . Squeezed him pretty good.”84

If nothing else, these text messages show the intention of Briles and his coaches
to handle discipline “in-house,” as well as their inappropriate involvement with
and confrontation of alleged victims.
B. A TOTAL SYSTEMATIC FAILURE: MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY AND LARRY
NASSAR
On its face, the heinous saga of Larry Nassar may seem altogether different
from the events which took place at Baylor. After all, Nassar was a cunning and
calculated pedophile who used his medical degree and position of authority to
abuse young women and girls throughout his tenure as a “professional.”85 Nassar,

82. Id. at 27. According to the police report, Oakman shoved a woman into “brick walls and
cabinets and shoved her face onto a bed.” Creg Stephenson, Baylor’s Shawn Oakman Accused of
Domestic Violence in 2013, Report Says, ADVANCE LOC. (Jan. 13, 2019),
https://www.al.com/sports/2016/04/baylors_shawn_oakman_accused_o.html
[https://perma.cc/H6A7-U8A2].
83. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint & Jury Demand ¶ 93, Doe v. Baylor Univ., 313 F. Supp. 3d
786 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (No. 6:17-CV-125) [hereinafter Jane Doe Complaint].
84. Id.
85. See Evans et al., supra note 16.
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like many serial abusers, was a master manipulator who could even fool police
officers into believing the alleged abuse suffered by his victims was a legitimate
medical treatment.86 Nassar hid behind a shield of “good will” as well as a
multitude of coaches, parents, and administrators who were willing to vouch for
his character.87 These distinctions aside, the story of Larry Nassar is very similar
to the Baylor scandal considering MSU’s failure to investigate their own
employee, all the while endangering countless students and young women from
across the country.
MSU’s internal investigations into Nassar were just as troubling as Baylor’s, if
not more so. Even after the arrest, guilty plea, and testimonials of more than 150
victims, the result was the same: a settlement, a sealed record, and no sign of new
legislation or even institutional reform on the part of MSU.88 To understand the
gravity of MSU’s failures, one must understand specifically what these women
told their coaches and trusted officials and that each allegation, despite being years
apart, described virtually the same facts.
During physical examinations and physical therapy of female athletes, Nassar,
in a closed room, without wearing gloves, using lubricant, or obtaining the
patient’s consent, would digitally penetrate the patient vaginally and anally, cup
their buttocks, and massage their breasts.89 Nassar would even become visibly
aroused during these examinations.90 When confronted about his “procedures”
by MSU and the police, Nassar explained that he was performing a legitimate
medical procedure known as a “pelvic adjustment” and that his patients simply
misunderstood what he was doing.91 Doctors (all of them Nassar’s colleagues) who
were consulted about the legitimacy of Nassar’s “treatments” concluded that
Nassar’s actions were “not of a sexual nature.”92 In turn, MSU’s Title IX office
dismissed complaint after complaint and charges were not filed.93 All the while,
more and more women were subjected to Nassar’s abuse.
As early as 1997, the cover-up began at MSU.94 A complaint filed against MSU
stated that the university and Kathie Klages, former MSU gymnastics coach, were
86. See Solomon, supra note 13, at 425–26.
87. John Barr & Dan Murphy, Nassar Surrounded by Adults Who Enabled His Predatory Behavior,
ABC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2018, 2:25 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/nassar-surrounded-adultsenabled-predatory-behavior/story?id=52387364 [https://perma.cc/P93J-K5QE].
88. Matt Mencarini & Justin A. Hinkley, Michigan State and 332 of Larry Nassar’s Victims Reach
‘Historic’ $500 Million Settlement, LANSING ST. J. (May 16, 2018, 5:44 PM),
https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2018/05/16/larry-nassar-michigan-statesettlement-lawsuit/614502002/ [https://perma.cc/D322-RJRX].
89. Complaint & Jury Demand ¶¶ 56, 82, 89, Brown v. Mich. St. Univ., No. 1:18-cv-1005
(W.D. Mich. Sept. 6, 2018) 2018 WL 4275601 [hereinafter Brown Complaint].
90. Id. ¶ 89; Mencarini, supra note 1.
91. Brown Complaint, supra note 89, ¶¶ 60–61; see Tracy Connor & Rehema Ellis, Michigan
Police Department Apologizes for Doubting 2004 Larry Nassar Accuser, NBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2018, 6:20
PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/michigan-police-department-apologize-doubtinglarry-nassar-accuser-n843126 [https://perma.cc/FYK8-2THK].
92. Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, In Nassar Case, Michigan State Wanted Famed Ex-Prosecutor to
Both
Examine
and
Defend
It,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
27,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/us/michigan-state-nassar-fitzgerald.html
[https://perma.cc/8BZP-SU2E].
93. See id.
94. See Brown Complaint, supra note 89, ¶ 58.
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made aware of Nassar’s conduct by a minor female athlete, Larissa Boyce.95 Boyce
told Klages that Nassar had abused her on multiple occasions during
“treatment.”96 Klages then asked another gymnast if she had received the same
“treatment” from Nassar as Boyce, who responded that she had; ultimately,
instead of investigating or reporting the alleged incidents, Klages convinced both
athletes to not “bring up Nassar’s conduct” or file a formal complaint.97 Klages
was later convicted of lying to police during the Nassar investigation and was
sentenced to 90 days in jail.98
The complaint’s allegations did not end there. It went on to name many other
employees or former employees from MSU who were notified of Nassar’s conduct:
• 1999: Kelli Bert, head coach of the women’s track and field team, as
well as other track trainers;99
• 2000: “the highest-ranking employees within MSU’s Training
Staff”;100
• 2001: Lianna Hadden, MSU athletic trainer;101
• 2004: Gary E. Stollak, former MSU psychologist whose license was
revoked in September 2018, following Nassar’s conviction, for failing
to report child abuse to authorities;102
• 2004: Meridian Township Police Department in Meridian Township,
Michigan;103
• 2014: William Strampel, former dean of MSU College of Osteopathic
Medicine and boss of Larry Nassar,104 who allegedly sent Nassar a list

95. Id. ¶ 59.
96. Id.
97. Id. ¶¶ 60–61.
98. Eric Levenson & Kristina Sgueglia, Ex-Michigan State Gymnastics Coach Turns Herself in on
Charges
Related
to
Nassar
Case,
CNN
(Aug.
30,
2018,
12:25
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/30/us/michigan-state-coach-kathie-klages-nassar/index.html
[https://perma.cc/455U-2QTV]; Dan Murphy & John Barr, Judge Sentences Ex-Michigan State
Gymnastics Coach Kathie Klages to Jail, ESPN (Aug 4, 2020), https://www.espn.com/collegesports/story/_/id/29594880/judge-sentences-ex-michigan-state-gymnastics-coach-kathie-klages-jail
[https://perma.cc/5UCE-S2TM].
99. Brown Complaint, supra note 89, ¶ 63.
100. Id. ¶ 65.
101. Id. ¶ 73.
102. Id. ¶ 76; Kara Berg, Former MSU Psychologist Surrenders License After Failing to Report Nassar
Abuse,
LANSING
ST.
J.
(Sept.
28,
2018,
11:08
AM),
https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2018/09/28/msu-psychologist-larry-nassarsex-abuse-license/1453742002/ [https://perma.cc/TU92-QR3F]. Stollak also sat down with the
parents of an abuse victim and Nassar to discuss the allegations. Berg, supra.
103. Brown Complaint, supra note 89, ¶ 80.
104. John Counts, Ex-MSU Dean William Strampel Has Criminal Case Adjourned, MICH. LIVE (Jan.
30,
2019),
https://www.mlive.com/news/index.ssf/2018/07/exmsu_dean_william_strampel_h.html [https://perma.cc/627A-SAZA]. In 2019, Strampel was
convicted of felony misconduct in office and willful neglect of duty and was sentenced to a year in
jail. See Megan Banta, Former MSU Dean William Strampel Sentenced to One Year in Jail, LANSING ST. J.
(Aug.
7,
2019,
2:20
PM),
https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2019/08/07/former-msu-dean-williamstrampel-sentenced-larry-nassar-michigan-state/1933906001/
[https://perma.cc/LR9A-BD3P].
Strampel’s retirement from MSU included full benefits. Counts, supra.
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of “guidelines” to adhere to during his “treatments”;105
• 2017: Brooke Lemmen, D.O., who resigned amidst allegations that
she “[r]emoved several boxes of confidential treatment patient records
from . . . MSU’s Sports Medicine clinic at . . . Nassar’s request . . . [and
m]ade a staff member feel pressured not to fully cooperate in an
internal investigation . . . against . . . Nassar.”106
With so many complaints against Nassar over such a long period of time,
MSU’s intent was clear: no one was to get to Nassar. From 1997 to 2014,
approximately eight different women informed or notified MSU of Larry Nassar’s
abuse, yet MSU took no action.107 Even worse, MSU’s Title IX office told victims
that they simply did not “understand the ‘nuanced difference’ between sexual
assault and an appropriate medical procedure,”108 further dismissing victims while
providing Nassar opportunity to continue abusing his patients. MSU protected
Nassar by presenting the illusion to the outside world that it had things under
control.
Nassar was temporarily suspended in 2014 after he was accused of sexually
assaulting a graduate student during a medical examination.109 Despite this
complaint, MSU cleared Nassar from internal discipline and let him come back
to work.110 Upon his return, some “mandatory guidelines” were put into place by
Strampel, the dean of the college of osteopathic medicine at the time, which stated
Nassar could no longer treat patients alone, had to alter his “procedure” to
minimize skin-to-skin contact, and new staff members were to be educated on
these new restrictions.111 Those guidelines were no more than a smoke screen:
In a March 14, 2017 interview with Michigan State University Police
Department Detective Sergeant Christopher Rozman, Defendant Strampel
admitted that the institutional restrictions and guidelines that Defendant
Nassar was subject to were illusory in nature because he only shared them
with [another one of Nassar’s supervisors] and took no action whatsoever to
ensure that the institutional restrictions and guidelines were implemented,
followed, or enforced.112
MSU’s failure to respond to allegations against Nassar was part of an ongoing
systematic failure. There were also multiple instances of MSU failing to respond
to complaints of sexual harassment of employees and dating violence.113 The
105. Brown Complaint, supra note 89, ¶ 95.
106. Id. ¶ 139.
107. Id. ¶ 243; Kim Kozlowski, What MSU Knew: 14 Were Warned of Nassar Abuse, DETROIT
NEWS (Jan. 19, 2018, 4:58 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/tech/2018/01/18/msupresident-told-nassar-complaint-2014/1042071001/ [https://perma.cc/H9ZK-NAWH].
108. Mencarini, supra note 1.
109. John Barr & Nicole Noren, Lawsuit: MSU Failed to Act on Early Claims of Sex Abuse by School
and
USA
Gymnastics
Doctor,
ESPN
(Dec.
21,
2016),
https://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/18325512/lawsuit-alleges-msu-failed-act-claims-sexabuse-school-usa-gymnastics-doctor [https://perma.cc/7D5C-GY8U].
110. Brown Complaint, supra note 89, ¶ 108.
111. Id. ¶ 94.
112. Id. ¶ 109.
113. See id. ¶ 240.
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inaction, phony guidelines, and illusory protective measures made clear to
Nassar’s victims that they were not to be believed and that MSU would prioritize
Nassar’s well-being over theirs, despite multiple allegations from multiple sources.
III. CIVIL CONSPIRACY IN ACTION
“The football program was a black hole into which reports of misconduct such as drug
use, physical assault, domestic violence, brandishing of guns, indecent exposure and
academic fraud disappeared.”114
A. STATE LAW ANALYSIS
State law claims of civil conspiracy have many advantages for plaintiffs in
positions similar to those at Baylor and MSU. One of these benefits lies in the
way of evidence. Generally, a party does not need direct evidence to prove a civil
conspiracy; instead “[i]t may be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions,
and circumstances which vary according to the purpose to be accomplished.”115
Thus, depending on the purpose of the alleged conspiracy, plaintiffs may not
necessarily have to show a single outright act.116 Additionally, plaintiffs may have
some leeway when it comes to proving an agreement between conspirators.117
Some courts have held that a conspiracy can be established based on an implied
agreement between conspirators.118
1. Involvement of Two or More Persons
First, a civil conspiracy requires the participation of two or more individuals
“acting together to achieve a shared goal that results in injury to another.” 119 In
Baylor’s case, it is likely that text messages and other correspondence between
Briles and his assistant coaches as well as discussions between Briles and
Shillinglaw are evidence of an agreement between at least two individuals.120
However, civil conspiracy claims are restricted by the so-called intracorporateconspiracy doctrine (ICD) which instructs that “an agreement between or among
agents of the same legal entity . . . is not an unlawful conspiracy.”121 At first glance,
it would appear that such a doctrine would wipe out any claim of civil conspiracy
against employees of a university, but a closer analysis shows a potential opening
in the law.122
114. Baylor Regents’ Answer, supra note 23, at 13.
115. DeNourie & Yost Homes, LLC v. Frost, 854 N.W.2d 298, 316 (Neb. 2014).
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. Id.; Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1988).
119. Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp., 894 A.2d 240, 254 (Conn. 2006) (quoting Harp
v. King, 835 A.2d 953, 972 (Conn. 2003)).
120. See Baylor Regents’ Answer, supra note 23, at 14.
121. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1867 (2017) (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769–771 (1984)).
122. See J.S. Nelson, The Corporate Conspiracy Vacuum, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 254 (2015)
(arguing for reimposing liability for an intracorporate conspiracy to prevent crime, regulate actions
of agents, and provide more effective recourse for victims).
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The most recent discussion of the ICD is in the 2017 Supreme Court case,
Ziglar v. Abbasi.123 In Ziglar, the Court discussed the validity of applying the ICD
to a § 1985(3) civil rights claim against federal officials for holding plaintiffs, all
of whom were of “Arab or South Asian descent,” in “harsh pretrial conditions”
because of racial animus.124 The majority acknowledged that the current “law on
the point is not well established” and that the Court had yet to approve of the
application of the ICD in the context of § 1985(3).125 While the majority’s
discussion of the application of the ICD to civil rights conspiracy claims is
certainly not an outright denouncement of the rule,126 it does acknowledge the
possibility that “different considerations apply to a conspiracy respecting equal
protection guarantees, as distinct from a conspiracy in the antitrust context”
where the ICD has traditionally been employed.127 Importantly, the Court’s policy
concerns about restricting open communication between federal officers would
not be applicable to a sex discrimination case involving members of a university
athletic department, where there is no concern of national security.128
Additionally, the Supreme Court recognized that for the ICD to thwart civil
conspiracy claims, the conspirators must have made an agreement while acting in
their “official capacities.”129 Applying this reasoning to the events at Baylor, when
“football coaches and staff took improper steps in response to disclosures of sexual
assault or dating violence that precluded the University from fulfilling its legal
obligations” or “had inappropriate involvement in disciplinary or criminal
matters,” they were likely acting outside their capacity as university employees.130
Ultimately, there is virtually no federal case law discussing application of the ICD
to § 1985 claims or any federal case law under any other civil conspiracy statute
in the context of sex discrimination by university officials, so it is certainly an open
question as to how a court might rule.
The potential issue of official immunity should also be addressed. “Official
immunity is protection from tort liability afforded to public officers and
employees for acts performed in the exercise of their discretionary functions.”131
Thus, the main focus of the analysis is on what the official was doing, not their
status or role as an official. Courts have also found liability if there is a danger of
imminent harm imposed by the official’s inaction or if a special relationship
existed between the official (or the school) and the student.132 The essential
argument for holding officials liable, particularly coaches and athletic staff, is that
they have elected to take the role of disciplinarian and investigator and, by doing

123. 37 S. Ct. at 1867–69.
124. Id. at 1847, 1853, 1867–68.
125. Id. at 1868 (noting a circuit split on ICD’s application to a § 1985 conspiracy claim).
126. Id. (“When the courts are divided on an issue so central to the cause of action alleged, a
reasonable official lacks the notice required before imposing liability.”).
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 1867 (referring to agents of the same legal entity making agreements “in the course of
their official duties”).
130. Findings of Fact, supra note 52, at 11.
131. Hunter, supra note 27, at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 294–95.
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so, have formed a “special relationship” which could result in liability.133 Likewise,
given the repeated failures of college officials to protect their students, it is in the
interest of public safety for a court to hold those officials accountable for their
actions.
2. An Unlawful Objective
The second element of a civil conspiracy is an “unlawful objective.”134 This
broad terminology has various interpretations in different jurisdictions, but
generally requires that the plaintiff prove the defendants acted with malice or
intent to harm them.135 Currently, there is a large disagreement among states as
to whether the conspiracy itself gives rise to a cause of action or if a separate
underlying tort must also be present.136 The Texas Supreme Court has held that
“merely proving a joint ‘intent to engage in the conduct that resulted in [an]
injury’” is not enough to bring an action for civil conspiracy.137 By contrast, the
Supreme Court of Florida has held that if the plaintiff can show the conspirators
held a “peculiar power of coercion” as compared to an individual, “then
conspiracy itself becomes an independent tort.”138 While this approach has been
heavily criticized for its vagueness,139 it does illustrate that at least one state
supreme court has been willing to recognize the inherent power imbalance a
conspiracy imposes on individuals.140
In the context of the Baylor or MSU scandals, finding an “unlawful objective”
outside of the federal statute presents some hurdles. For one, Texas does not
recognize negligence as an unlawful objective giving rise to a civil conspiracy claim
“[b]ecause negligence by definition is not an intentional wrong,” so no group can
agree or conspire to be negligent.141 Problematically, most of the state law claims
filed by victims against Baylor have been for negligence or gross negligence.142
Likewise, Michigan has similar laws requiring proof of a separate tort.143 And
while survivors of Larry Nassar have also tended to file claims of negligence against
MSU,144 one survivor did include a claim of civil conspiracy against MSU, Nassar,

133. See id. at 295.
134. Buchwalter, supra note 42, § 1.
135. Id. § 9.
136. Norman L. Greene, Civil Conspiracy and the Rule of Law: A Proposal for Reappraisal and Reform,
64 ARK. L. REV. 301, 333–35 (2011).
137. Tri v. J.T.T., 162 S.W.3d 552, 557 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Juhl v. Arlington, 936 S.W.2d 640,
644 (Tex. 1996)).
138. Churruca v. Miami Jai-Alai, Inc., 353 So.2d 547, 550 (Fla. 1977).
139. See Greene, supra note 136, at 335.
140. See Churruca, 353 So.2d at 550 (“[I]n certain circumstances mere force of numbers acting in
unison may comprise an actionable wrong.”).
141. Juhl, 936 S.W.2d at 644.
142. See, e.g., Elizabeth Doe Complaint, supra note 24, ¶¶ 133–47.
143. Advoc. Org. for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 670 N.W.2d 569, 580 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Early Detection Ctr., PC v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 403 N.W.2d 830 (Mich.
1986)).
144. See, e.g., Fifth Amended Complaint & Reliance on Jury Demand, Denhollander v. Mich. St.
Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00029 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 28, 2018), 2018 WL 4961851 [hereinafter Denhollander
Complaint].
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USA Gymnastics, and former MSU staff, but that plaintiff has since settled.145 As
of March 2020, litigation continues against MSU, its employees, and USA
Gymnastics.146
Additionally, the events at MSU present some unique opportunities to bring
claims of civil conspiracy based on the claims of fraud and fraudulent concealment
made by survivors against Nassar and MSU. Complaints allege that
when
officials and coaches at MSU denied pursuing victims’ complaints and stated that
Nassar was simply performing a “new procedure” or “medical treatment,” they
were knowingly making false statements or recklessly making statements without
knowledge of the truth and then concealing their fraudulent statements with
more material misrepresentations.147 These torts of fraud and fraudulent
concealment would perfectly fit within current understanding of “unlawful
objectives” in any state, regardless of whether they required a separate underlying
tort or not.
Similarly, following the events at Baylor, one plaintiff has alleged that Baylor’s
concealment of football players’ misconduct as well as its attempt to discourage
the plaintiff from pursuing a sexual assault claim against her attacker constituted
fraudulent concealment.148 By showing that the defendants agreed to make
fraudulent statements and conceal misconduct with their fraud, a plaintiff can
likely establish the first two elements of a civil conspiracy claim.
3. An Agreement or Understanding of the Means to be Used
The third element requires a showing that the parties agreed to achieve by
concerted action an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose by unlawful means.149
This has also been formulated as a “meeting of the minds” between the
conspirators and an understanding of their mutual goal.150 This mutual
understanding can be proven by circumstantial evidence but usually requires
proof of vital facts by more than a scintilla of evidence.151
For the Baylor plaintiffs, they would have to prove that Briles and other coaches
or officials met, or discussed in some way, their unlawful objectives. Possible proof
could come in the form of text messages, correspondence between Briles and his
staff, other kinds of formal correspondence between coaches, as well as any
discussions of “unofficial policies” which were generally understood by the

145. Brown Complaint, supra note 89, ¶¶ 527–30 (claim for civil conspiracy and concerted
action); see, e.g., Plaintiff’s Motion & Brief for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice of Claims,
Denhollander v. Mich. St. Univ., Nos. 1:18-cv-01005 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2019), ECF No. 1380;
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion & Brief for Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice of Claims,
Denhollander v. Mich. St. Univ., Nos. 1:17-cv-00029, 1:18-cv-01005 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2020), ECF
No. 1422.
146. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant MSU’s Motion to Dismiss, Epple v.
Mich. St. Univ., Nos. 1:17-cv-00029, 1:18-cv-01047 (W.D. Mich. Mar.10, 2020) 2020 WL 1678305.
147. Id. ¶¶ 174–200; Denhollander Complaint, supra note 144, ¶¶ 1753–68.
148. Jane Doe Complaint, supra note 83, ¶¶ 136–44.
149. Greene, supra note 136, at 331–32.
150. Lamont v. Vaquillas Energy Lopeno, Ltd., 421 S.W.3d 198, 220 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2013, pet. denied).
151. Id. at 209, 220.
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coaching staff.152
4. An Overt Act in Furtherance of the Conspiracy
Unlike in a criminal conspiracy, where the “gravamen of the offense is the
agreement itself,” a civil conspiracy requires “damage resulting to the plaintiff
from an overt act done pursuant to a common design.”153 Common law does not
require that all involved in the conspiracy commit the overt act.154 Instead, “[i]t is
only necessary to prove that one of the participants committed an unlawful act in
furtherance of the conspiracy.”155 It should be noted that the overt act in question
usually requires specific intent to commit a tort or some other unlawful act.156
A Delaware Supreme Court case provides an illustrative analysis for a claim
involving alleged misrepresentations by an asbestos manufacturer.157 In Nicolet,
Inc. v. Nutt, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, addressed
“whether a cause of action exists against a party whose asbestos products did not
cause . . . injury, but who allegedly conspired with other . . . manufacturers to
actively suppress and intentionally misrepresent medical evidence.”158 The court
answered in the affirmative.159 In its reasoning, the court pointed out that the
active suppression of information about the dangers of asbestos and the specific
“intent to induce plaintiffs’ continued exposure to asbestos” would result in joint
and several liability for all members of the conspiracy, regardless of whether their
product actually caused the injury.160
The cases at Baylor and MSU provide a structure similar to that of Nicolet.
Applying Nicolet under a theory of fraudulent concealment, the plaintiffs would
have to show that their universities actively suppressed information regarding
sexual assaults on their campus or misinformed plaintiffs as to what events
transpired with the specific intent to deceive or defraud the plaintiffs.161 A court
may be more inclined to find for plaintiffs here given the seriousness and
prevalence of Baylor and MSU’s efforts to suppress evidence, the damage done to
past victims, and the fact that the misrepresentations stopped victims from
pursuing claims against their attackers.
5. Injury Resulting from the Overt Act
The final element requires an actual injury to the plaintiff as a result of the
conspiracy’s overt, unlawful act.162 That is to say, the conspirators’ actions must
be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.163 For example, a tugboat
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See Baylor Regents’ Answer, supra note 23, at 13–14.
Buchwalter, supra note 42, § 2.
Id. § 12.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. §§ 12–13.
Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 147 (Del. 1987).
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Id. at 150.
Id.
See id.
Buchwalter, supra note 42, § 16.
Walters v. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 443 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply
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captain’s civil conspiracy claim against a marine towing company was unsuccessful
because the captain failed to allege that his financial problems were caused by a
“covert agreement” between the defendants and not by losing his job.164
This issue can be resolved with proper pleading by plaintiffs. Another
formulation of proximate cause is “whether the injuries and damages to the
plaintiff [were] a reasonable and probable consequence of the act or omission of
the defendant.”165 This element can be met if the defendant knew or should have
known there was “an appreciable chance” that their conduct would cause
injury.166
Plaintiffs could easily meet this burden by alleging that Baylor or MSU’s
inaction and suppression of evidence created an appreciable chance of injury to
plaintiffs and, for many plaintiffs, in fact caused their injuries. Had Baylor’s
coaching staff or its Title IX office properly addressed accusations against the
football team, many women would not have been assaulted by the repeat offenders
in the program.167 Likewise, had MSU athletic staff or medical staff appropriately
classified Nassar’s behavior as assault, then not nearly as many women would have
been abused.168
While civil conspiracy claims in this context are somewhat of a new frontier,
plaintiffs have a unique opportunity to hold all the bad actors responsible.
Moreover, such lawsuits will give plaintiffs the opportunity to delve into what
really transpired behind closed university doors and to more effectively pursue
claims against those with substantial roles in the cover-ups.
B. FEDERAL ANALYSIS: CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS
Fortunately for plaintiffs, claims of civil conspiracy are built into federal statutes
which seek to prevent the deprivation of civil rights; one example is 42 U.S.C. §
1985(3), which does not require that the plaintiff allege a separate tort or act of
discrimination.169 Instead, the language of the statute provides a civil cause of
action against “two or more persons in any State or Territory” that “conspire . . .
for the purpose of depriving . . . any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws.”170 Unlike state law civil conspiracy claims, actions under
§ 1985(3) do not require a separate actionable underlying tort; as a matter of law,
the mere proof of a conspiracy to deprive someone of equal protection is sufficient
to establish a claim.171
However, current judicial interpretation of the statute creates some
constitutional challenges for plaintiffs that are not present when bringing civil
Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 453 (2006)).
164. Alonso v. McAllister Towing of Charleston, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 645, 652 (D.S.C. 2009)
(applying South Carolina law).
165. See Envirotech, Inc. v. Thomas, 259 S.W.3d 577, 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
166. Id.
167. See Elizabeth Doe Complaint, supra note 24, ¶ 144.
168. See Denhollander Complaint, supra note 144, ¶ 21.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
170. Id.
171. See id.
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conspiracy claims under state law. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he
language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection . . . means that there must
be some . . . class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators’ action.”172 In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, the Supreme
Court refused to specifically address whether “women in general” were a
“qualifying class under § 1985(3).”173 The Court held that animus does not
require “maliciously motivated . . . discrimination against women,” but concluded
that “animus does demand . . . at least a purpose that focuses upon women by
reason of their sex,” such as denying women into the practice of law simply because
they were women.174 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the underlying
purpose behind the requirement of animus was to avoid the conversion of §
1985(3) into “general federal tort law.”175 With all this in mind, the question
presented is: Can a Title IX claim for sex discrimination fulfill the requirement of
animus posed by § 1985(3)?
The standards for proving damages liability under Title IX are significantly
different from an action under the Equal Protection Clause. In the context of
sexual harassment, Supreme Court precedent states that bringing a Title IX
lawsuit only requires a finding that the school acted with deliberate indifference
to known claims of sexual harassment “regardless of any allegations of gendermotivated animus or differential treatment.”176 By contrast, “the class of
individuals protected by. . . [§ 1985(3)] are those so-called ‘discrete and insular’
minorities that receive special protection under the Equal Protection Clause.”177
It is altogether possible that these claims are interchangeable. As one scholar
notes, “Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause are the same” because of their
mutual “right to be free from discrimination based on sex.”178 Applying this
reasoning, plaintiffs might have a valid argument for a § 1985(3) claim based on
violations of Title IX, particularly given the growing prevalence of these kinds of
scandals in college athletics.
While bringing claims of civil conspiracy against universities and their athletic
departments is not without hurdles, it is certainly an option for plaintiffs who
seek to hold all individual actors accountable for their actions. Alternatively, some
extralegal solutions may exist or could soon come into existence to help plaintiffs
in this same way.
C. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
The main policy reason supporting a plaintiff’s claim of civil conspiracy is that

172. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
173. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269–70 (1993).
174. Id. at 270.
175. Id. at 269 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217, 253 (2005).
177. Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modern Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section
1985(3), 64 TEX. L. REV. 527, 583 (1985) (quoting Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1150 (6th Cir.
1980)).
178. Cohen, supra note 176, at 283 n.129; Michael A. Zwibelman, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude
Section 1983 Claims, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1479 (1998).
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allowing these claims would hold those involved in sexual assault cover-ups
accountable and would deter others from hiding information from investigators,
thus preventing more assaults.179 Alternative means to the same end, while novel,
may very well be viable. These mainly involve completely removing coaches and
athletic personnel from their role as disciplinarians of student-athletes.180 Clearly,
after the events at Colorado, Baylor, Penn State, and MSU (to name a few), the
temptation is too great for coaches to prioritize their athletes and institutions over
victims.
Schools could mandate that discipline for any off-field misconduct be handled
by an independent university panel.181 Although a university panel would not be
totally unbiased in their handlings of discipline, this would be a proper step
toward impartiality. Additionally, the university panel could also consist of a few
non-athlete students or members of the community who might provide even more
objectivity.
Likewise, state legislatures have an opportunity to implement policies which
promote transparency in reporting and impose a higher duty of care on
universities and their officials. For example, the state of Illinois has “passed laws
mandating that colleges create a detailed policy for responding to reports of sexual
assault and requiring the submission of data, on an annual basis, to the State’s
Attorney General’s Office.”182 These higher reporting standards may result in
more individual accountability and internal investigations by universities.
Legislatures could also create “regional centers for investigation and
adjudication” based on a proposal by members of the law firm Pepper Hamilton
who investigated Baylor.183 These regional centers would function as independent
investigative and adjudicative centers where victims could safely report incidences
of sexual violence and be provided forensic examination services and accurate
information regarding their rights as victims and plans of action after an assault.184
These centers could take many forms, including an “independent non-profit
organization, an arm of a prosecutor’s office, or a newly created government
agency.”185 Moreover, these regional centers would harmonize efforts of
governments, law enforcement, and universities by coordinating their efforts to
investigate claims of sexual violence.186 Commentators have identified five major
benefits to facilities of this nature: (1) they would function as an independent and
objective body of investigation and their off-campus locations might encourage
more victims to report abuse; (2) centers would encourage collaboration between
law enforcement and higher education, increasing transparency on both sides; (3)
cooperative measures would streamline investigative and disciplinary action taken
179. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 13, at 395–96.
180. Id. at 430.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 431.
183. Gina Maisto Smith & Leslie M. Gomez, The Regional Center for Investigation and Adjudication:
A Proposed Solution to the Challenges of Title IX Investigations in Higher Education, 120 PENN. ST. L. REV.
977, 997–1000 (2016).
184. Id. at 997–98.
185. Id. at 998.
186. Id.
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by either the university or law enforcement; (4) the investigative nature of the
facilities would allow for a clean separation between a center of victim advocacy
and an investigative center, further promoting higher accuracy of findings of fact;
and (5) these centers “would eliminate the inefficiency and enormous drain on
resources associated with building and maintaining in-house investigative and
adjudicative processes at educational institutions.”187
Finally, universities could alter their policies regarding new contracts with
school officials, professors, and coaches. Such amendments could deny severance
to an employee should they violate school sexual assault reporting policies. This
might also function as an effective deterrent for any would-be conspirator who
found themselves in the position of Art Briles or the officials at MSU. With these
measures in place, university employees would be deterred from failing to report
a sexual assault or intimidating a victim.
D. THE STATE OF AFFAIRS TODAY
MSU has continued to experience institutional upheaval in the wake of the
Nassar scandal.188 In September 2019, the university was fined $4.5 million by the
U.S. Education Department for its failure to respond to the sexual assault
complaints against Nassar.189 Additionally, two university presidents have
resigned since the scandal broke, one of whom was charged with two felonies and
two misdemeanors for allegedly lying to a peace officer who was investigating
complaints against Nassar.190 In June 2019, William Strampel, Nassar’s boss, was
not only found guilty of “willful neglect of duty” in his supervision of Nassar but
also of “misconduct in office” stemming from allegations that he made sexually
explicit comments to several female students and grabbed one student’s
buttocks.191 He was sentenced to a year in jail, but only served 8 months.192
As of December 2020, Baylor was still under criminal investigation by Texas
state law enforcement and McLennan County District Attorney Barry Johnson.193
187. Id. at 998–99.
188. Associated Press, How the Larry Nassar Scandal has Affected Others, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb.
25, 2021), https://www.tampabay.com/news/latest/2021/02/25/how-the-larry-nassar-scandal-hasaffected-others/ [https://perma.cc/5RNS-MF75].
189. Id.
190. Id.; Evan Jones, Ex-MSU President Lou Anna K. Simon’s Preliminary Exam Ends with Closing
Statements, STATE NEWS (July 24, 2019), https://statenews.com/article/2019/07/ex-msu-presidentlou-anna-k-simons-preliminary-exam-concludes-with-closing-statements
[https://perma.cc/YD77Z5M6]. The criminal charges were ultimately dropped. Associated Press, supra note 188.
191. Beth LeBlanc, Strampel Guilty of Misconduct in Office, Not Guilty of Criminal Sexual Conduct,
DETROIT
NEWS
(June
12,
2019,
5:16
PM),
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2019/06/12/strampel-guiltymisconduct-office-not-guilty-criminal-sexual-conduct/1429780001/
[https://perma.cc/YPU63R9K].
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Four lawsuits against the school are still ongoing, including a federal lawsuit
involving fifteen women.194 After being fired from Baylor in 2016, former head
coach Art Briles was hired to lead an East Texas high school football program in
2019.195 Following their dismissals from Baylor, Briles and former university
president Ken Starr were paid $15.1 million and $4.5 million in severance,
respectively.196
IV. CONCLUSION
“Come hell or high water we’ll take every last one of you down that could have stopped
this monster.”197
The bottom line is this: had the coaches, athletic department officials, or
university authorities at Penn State, Colorado, Baylor, or MSU responded to
allegations with any semblance of impartiality or objectivity, as is expected from
those who run our institutions of higher education, there would have been fewer
victims. More women and children would have been spared abuse had policies
been followed or improved. The facts and results of these scandals all sing the
same tune and, if anything, encourage universities to cover up more allegations,
not less.
As things stand, the cover-up formula is simple and effective: (1) prioritize
reputation (and therefore revenue) over student safety and well-being; (2)
selectively hide or obfuscate any allegations which may jeopardize the university’s
athletic program; (3) once the scandal breaks, let the top administrators resign
and pay them a large severance package; (4) settle with the victims, limiting as
much public exposure as possible, using school insurance or tuition funds—
passing expenses onto the student body; and (5) rinse and repeat. This pattern has
gone on long enough and will only continue if drastic measures are not taken to
ensure the safety of students.
No longer should education administrators and coaches be able to pull the
strings of their own systems of “discipline,” putting countless young women at
risk, only to receive a full severance package when caught. At any level and in any
context, such a result is illogical and appalling. Hopefully, through either
application of state law, federal law, or even extralegal solutions, plaintiffs will
soon be able to hold these bad actors responsible, accelerating the healing process.
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